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The Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative, in Detroit, Michigan, involved 
a team of Federal, State, and Local agencies that worked together on systematically addressing 
gun violence in that city (see Appendix 1).  The MSU research partnership began work in 
October 2000 in collaboration with that team.  Below we document the process by which the 
working group chose to focus on a single precinct and the interventions that were undertaken at 
the working group’s direction.  Examples of research and analyses that guided this work are 
presented as accompanying figures. 
The SACSI Model 
The Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative rests to a large degree upon the 
foundation created through the Boston Gun Project.   The key components of the approach 
established in Boston were incorporated into the SASCI approach.  Critical to this strategy, and 
an aspect that is distinctly different from other approaches, is that the process is emphasized 
rather than focusing exclusively upon implementing specific programs.  
  The SASCI model is a problem solving process that is based upon crafting data based 
interventions to address local gun problems.  One of the major principals of this approach is that 
in order to design effective interventions an understanding of the dynamics of gun crime must be 
obtained prior to program implementation.  Traditionally the operation of the criminal justice 
system has been based upon the processing of individual cases.  The SACSI model suggests that 
although cases will continue to be the “currency” of criminal justice, there should also be an 
emphasis upon solving problems and not just moving cases to the next stage of criminal justice 
processing.  In this process cases are analyzed to discover patterns and trends that may exist 
across cases that will reveal the “underlying problem” that can be addressed through 
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which interventions are to be implemented.  While in some regards there are similarities across 
sites in the descriptions of gun violence, upon closer examination, dramatic differences are often 
discovered. Thus interventions should not just be “imported” from other jurisdictions and grafted 
on to the local criminal justice system.   
  Another important characteristic of the SASCI model was the creation of a task force to 
work together in a collaborative process in the problem analysis and the design and 
implementation of interventions.   While the research partner was responsible for conducting the 
data collection and problem analysis, this work was to be informed and guided by the task force. 
In an NIJ assessment of another initiative to establish collaborative teams working on criminal 
justice system improvement issues, it was noted that a key to the success of these teams was to 
“teach and help team members to ask the right questions, collect and interpret data, and use data 
to drive better policymaking and decisionmaking” (Policy Studies Inc., 11, 2004).   In addition, 
the SASCI model also calls for a greater interaction among task force members and consequently 
an increased sharing of information across traditional criminal justice boundaries.   
  While this model implies a direct linear flow from problem identification to analysis to 
intervention, it is rare that the development follows such a straightforward path.  The typical 
process involves many starts and stops as resource issues, personnel changes, and other 
challenges to implementation are common.  This was certainly the case in Detroit as well as 
other SACSI sites.  The following sections chronicle the development and implementation of 
SACSI in Detroit.   
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Data collection, which was facilitated by the FBI liaison to the SACSI working group, 
involved active collaboration between the Detroit Police Department, Wayne County 
Community Justice, the Michigan Department of Corrections, and ATF.  Michigan State 
University researchers used these data sources and the advantages of mapping to allow for 
overlays of corrections data, gun tracing data, and local crime data as well as other sources for a 
visual representation of the problem of gun violence in Detroit.  The working group used this 
research as a launching point for selecting an area for a focused intervention. 
As with any effort of technical assistance, reliance on official data sources presented 
some problems that should be cautions for similarly situated researchers.  Arrests, for example, 
included no linkage with offense reports in the Detroit police department databases.  Thus, there 
was no way to tie offenders with the locations of specific offenses.  Although there was a flag 
regarding gun involvement in one of the databases on reported incidents, in many cases certainty 
of gun involvement could only be attained through a review of case files by research assistants or 
local agencies (for example, the Michigan Department of Corrections personnel hand sorted case 
files in one office to build a data base for paroled gun offenders, which could be shared with 
Detroit’s police officers involved in the initiative).   
 
Figure 1 illustrates the degree of gun involvement in various crime types as reflected in 
official crime reports recorded by the Detroit Police Department for the year 1999.  These data 
were then used to focus on crimes of Carrying Concealed Weapons (CCW), Robbery, and 
Homicide as offenses in which guns were more likely to be involved.    Like many major urban 
centers, guns and gun-related violence play an important role in the dynamics of violence in 
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slightly more than 80 percent of homicides, 75 percent of robberies, and 35 percent of serious 
assaults in Detroit involve firearms.  These patterns remain consistent across domestic and non-
domestic crime situations.   
 
Models for Intervention: How do we know what levers to pull? 
  The toll of gun violence in the 1990’s was remarkable in its magnitude and its 
concentration among youthful minority males (Blumstein, 1995; Cook and Laub, 2002; Zimring 
& Hawkins, 1997).  Public health researchers and social scientists have converged on the issue of 
illegal guns and gun violence due to its prominence as a national problem and the enormity of 
the health and social consequences (e.g., Dahlberg, 1998; Wintemute, 2000; Lizotte, Bonsell, 
McDowall, Krohn, Thornberry, 2002; Braga, 2003).   Criminal justice interventions that focused 
on persons at high-risk for gun violence, such as the Boston Gun Project appear to have had 
wide-ranging impacts on homicide levels (Braga, Kennedy, Waring, and Piehl, 2001).  The 
precise knowledge about what “levers” (in the parlance of Kennedy, 1997) produce the greatest 
effects in reducing violence is an area that would yield important research results for policy and 
practice in criminal justice.  In addition, knowledge about the relative effectiveness of specific 
strategies targeting known offenders would provide insight for strategic police partnerships. 
Offender-centered efforts in criminal justice hinge upon the seminal work of Wolfgang, 
Sellin, and Figlio (1972) that indicated high rate offenders are a relatively rare phenomenon 
comprising perhaps five percent of the population but accounting for a large proportion of 
criminal activity.  Wright and Rossi (1994) support the notion that gun offending is similarly 
restricted among serious offenders.  Their research indicated that while half of the incarcerated 
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relatively small subgroup (22%) of all offenders.  Lizotte and Sheppard (2001), Tesoriero (1998), 
and Lizotte, Tesoriero, Thornberry, and Krohn (1994) have done extensive research on gun 
carrying of city youths in Rochester, New York. Overall that research indicates that a small 
proportion of the total pool of offenders is at risk for carrying weapons for both defensive 
(protection) and offensive (committing crimes) purposes.   However, according to surveys of 
youthful offenders from Detroit, who were committed to Michigan prisons, more than 50% 
reported carrying a gun everyday regardless of the type of conviction offense (Huebner, Bynum, 
and Hinduja, 2001). 
Whether incapacitation strategies focused on such offenders can work is an open question 
(Blumstein, Cohen, Roth, & Visher, 1986) and whether effects can be detected from efforts at 
apprehending known offenders is also a testable hypothesis.  That police can actively target 
serious offenders, especially those with a warrant status is not an open question.  Martin and 
Sherman (1986) examined the Repeat Offender Program in Washington, D.C. and found the 
squad to be quite effective in taking known offenders out of circulation.   The effects of such a 
program on crime are, however, unclear.  Sherman’s (1990) own work on police crackdowns 
indicates that, if a concerted effort were undertaken to maintain surveillance on and apprehend 
known offenders it would be possible to a.)  Incapacitate those that are being held on warrants b.)  
Communicate to those offenders that the risk of being caught for involvement in criminal 
activities is raised or at least not calculable as a minimal risk.  The former point rests soundly in 
the ambit of incapacitation, which notes that offenders with high lambdas (i.e., high rates of 
offending) are likely to have a disproportionate effect on local crime, if they are taken off of the 
street for a period of time.  The latter point rests in the theory of specific deterrence, or rather 
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risk of apprehension is low (reversing the use of certainty in Bentham’s formulation of 
deterrence theory).  
One could argue that introducing a stimulus into the environment, such as a sustained 
targeting of known gun offenders, will have an incapacitation effect on those apprehended. It 
may, however, also have a deterrent effect on offenders, once knowledge of the intervention is 
communicated.  Kennedy (1997), for example, has argued persuasively that the targeting of 
known offenders is an area where law enforcement efforts can have demonstrable impacts on 
violence.  Rather than adopting a general deterrence strategy that widely distributes scarce 
resources across a wide area, this approach targets these resources on individuals most in need of 
police attention. 
With respect to the effectiveness of programs that target offenders, the Boston Gun 
Project (Braga, Kennedy, Waring, & Piehl, 2001; Piehl, Kennedy, & Braga, 2000) illustrates that 
offender-centered efforts can be extremely effective. Operation Ceasefire, as the Boston Project 
is also known, focused an enforcement and lever-pulling message to gang-involved youths, with 
particular focus on gangs involved in violent behavior. The research of Braga, Kennedy, Waring, 
and Piehl (2001) indicates that Ceasefire yielded a 63% reduction in monthly youth homicides 
after the program was implemented. 
McGarrell, Chermak, Weiss, and Wilson (2002) similarly illustrated that police focused 
on suspicious offenders in one Indianapolis police beat, that adopted specific deterrence 
enforcement strategies, produced a measurable decrease in gun crimes.  Similarly, Sherman and 
Rogan’s (1995) research in Kansas City also demonstrated the effectiveness of programs focused 
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subsequent reductions in gun crimes in target neighborhoods. 
This strand of problem-focused research, targeting gun violence, is a departure from prior 
research that debated the effectiveness of police in controlling serious crime (e.g., Jacobs & 
Rich, 1981; cf. Wilson & Boland, 1978; Sampson & Cohen, 1988).  These three instances noted 
above, however, illustrate demonstrable impact on serious gun crime using law enforcement 
intelligence to focus scarce resources on problem individuals.  
Another innovation that is important for understanding the changes that accompanied the 
Detroit SACSI effort is the interlinkage between the police department and other criminal justice 
agencies, particularly the Department of Corrections.   This was informed by other police-
corrections efforts that unfortunately remain largely unstudied with respect to effectiveness.  
Operation Night Light in Boston, the Minneapolis Anti-Violence Initiative, and the Anchorage 
Coordinated Agency Network (CAN) all represent implemented partnerships.  Giblin’s (2002) 
evaluation of CAN, which focused on juveniles, indicated that enhanced supervision was of 
questionable value, which has been the case of larger evaluations by Petersilia and Turner 
(1992).  No research had been produced with respect to the effectiveness of the surveillance of 
serious adult gun offenders in conjunction with police assistance.  Thus, the evidence of gun 
violence reductions in Boston that is contemporaneous with the implementation of Operation 
Night Light (e.g. Kennedy, Braga, & Piehl, 2001) offer possibility that such programs can 
effectively curtail serious adult crime. 
Taken together, these streams of research suggested two avenues of action for the SACSI 
participants, once problem analysis had been completed.  First, spending resources across the 
entire city or, for that matter, across all offenders, would be unlikely to yield a discernible 
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individuals appears to be a strategy under which a measurable crime reduction might occur.  
Second, the compartmentalization of criminal justice, popularized by the diagram of criminal 
justice case flow can no longer represent reality (Challenge of Crime in A Free Society, 1968: 
72-73).  Instead, one must expect feedback loops and collaboration between agencies such as 
police, probation, and parole.  The SACSI working group efforts constitutes a demonstration of 
these two points in action, as resources were targeted and normal criminal justice routines were 
supplanted with collaboration.  
 
Problem Analysis: The Geography of Gun Violence in Detroit, MI 
Moving beyond simply analyzing trends for major crimes in Detroit, the second level of 
analysis sought to discern the geographic distribution of crime in the City.  There was agreement 
among the task force that a specific area of the city should be selected in which to focus 
interventions.  Attempting to implement strategies city wide would have diluted the intensity of 
these efforts and would not have produced sufficient dosage to expect positive results.  Thus an 
initial task was to select an area that was suitable for these gun violence strategies and 
interventions.  Resources could then be focused on one or two precincts with the greatest need 
and areas within those precincts could likewise be targeted as well.   
As illustrated by Figure 2, the Detroit Police Department deploys personnel and 
resources to 13 separate precincts. Precincts are subdivided into 133 Scout Car Areas, which are 
approximately 1 square mile. Odd numbered precincts are on the east side of the City and even 
numbered precincts are on the west side.  The smaller geographic areas depicted on this map 
within each precinct represent scout car areas.  The City of Detroit also surrounds two cities, 
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grids).   
A first step in understanding the gun violence dimensions in Detroit involved the search 
for spatial patterns and persistence of areas as gun violence “hotspots” over time.  These analyses 
were in response to questions from the task force regarding skepticism regarding the degree to 
which locations of crime could be “predicted”.  These issues arose from police administrators 
who were primarily concerned with a tactical approach that would focus upon individual 
incidents.  The perception was that robbery was quite mobile and that there was no telling where 
the next rash of robberies would break out.  These analyses demonstrated that although the 
location of the next armed robbery could not be accurately predicted there were areas of the city 
that had persistent armed robbery problems.  Across the almost two year period there were areas 
of the city that, in each quarter, were consistently high in the numbers of armed robberies that 
took place.  Thus adopting a strategic approach to addressing robbery in these areas may be 
productive.  This was an important development in the evolution of the task force and the 
establishment of a strategic approach. 
Plotting armed robberies and ranking the scout car areas in terms of their relative 
quarterly rank in armed robberies helped to determine the extent and persistence of the gun 
violence problems.    The map in Figure 3 includes reported armed robberies for the period 
January 2000 – September 2001.  Based on a review of the data, scout car areas were defined as 
“problems” if they averaged one per week during a quarter.  Subsequently, this map then 
presents the total number of quarters each area was considered to be a problem out of the seven 
quarters of this time period.  Dark shades of red indicate chronic problem areas.  Several areas of 
concentration are evident in the 8
th, 9
th, 10
th, 11
th, and 12
th precincts.   
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city of Detroit from sources such as Michigan Department of Corrections records, as well as 
Court records maintained by Wayne County.  A focus on the location of violent incidents such as 
stranger gun assaults, homicides, and non-fatal shootings during 2000 represented one 
component of the SACSI group’s decision-making.  A second component focused upon 
concentrations of known offenders who had engaged in gun violence.   One indicator of such 
concentrations focused upon scout car areas that had high levels of individuals imprisoned for 
homicide or armed robbery between 1998-2000.  Scout car areas that produced high levels of 
juvenile referrals for aggravated assault and robbery between 1995-2000 were also considered.  
In addition, scout car areas with large numbers of probationers serving sentences for assault or 
CCW were also included as criteria for selecting an intervention precinct.  Consonant with the 
findings shown in Figure 3, precincts 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 had substantial numbers of scout car 
areas that scored high on indicators of violent incidents and violent individuals. 
  The SACSI working group convened a selection meeting on March 1, 2001 to determine 
what precinct would be chosen for the intervention effort.  Based on the aforementioned research 
several precincts had substantial indications of the presence of violent events as well as violent 
individuals, therefore, a decision was made to look at community characteristics beyond gun 
violence.  Feedback from the initial five SASCI sites indicated that the selection of the target 
area should not be based upon crime factors alone.  Factors of community organization and 
support were also critical in building a viable intervention in these cities.  Thus, the discussions 
in Detroit expanded to consider community characteristics in the selection of an area for project 
focus. 
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community disorganization (80 buildings or more in a scout car area) which existed to some 
extent across all precincts.   Figure 4 illustrates that the 9
th and 12
th precincts both contained 
areas with more than 150 abandoned buildings, and the 10
th precinct had moderately high levels 
across most of its area.  The 8
th precinct, also had areas of high concentration, but it shared an 
equally large number of scout car areas that did not have extensive abandoned building 
problems.  Informally, the 8
th precinct was mentioned as having dynamic community meetings at 
the precinct and was considered as being the area in which community influences might be 
harnessed to affect violence.  The presence of a strong Weed & Seed program shared between 
the 8
th precinct and the 12
th precinct supported that notion as well.  At the conclusion of this 
meeting the working group concluded that they would focus on the 8
th precinct and include the 
command staff from that area in future planning meetings to sharpen the problem analysis.  
Learning from the first round of SACSI sites was important in the selection of an area with 
viable community groups as well as strong police leadership. 
 
Focusing Analysis on the Eighth Precinct Target Area 
Detroit’s Eighth precinct had a population of approximately 106,000 according to the 
2000 Census (see Table 1).  It comprises 14 scout car areas and has an area approximately 15 
square miles.  The population consists of nearly 90 percent African Americans and 30 percent of 
the population was at or under the age of 17.  Unemployment, though not as high as city-wide 
statistics, was above 10% and 8% of the households reported receiving public assistance.  The 
table below presents the precinct as an area with poverty as a clear issue, but not necessarily as 
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intervention site. 
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Table 1: Census 2000 Data for the 8
th precinct and City of Detroit 
 8
th Precinct City 
    
Total Population  106,330 951,270 
Percent Male  45.7 47.1 
Percent White    8.1  12.4 
Percent African American  89.4 81.4 
Percent 17 or under  30.0 31.1 
Percent Unemployed (16 and older in the labor 
force) 
10.5 13.8 
Percent Households Receiving Public 
Assistance 
  8.3  11.4 
Percent Household Density (more than 1.51 
residents/room) 
 2.6    3.0 
Percent Female Headed Families  43.7 47.5 
Percent Families Below Poverty  14.4 21.7 
Percent Vacant Units    5.0  10.3 
Percent Renter Occupied Units  29.7 40.5 
 
 
Crime Patterns in the 8
th Precinct 
In addition, this precinct had large numbers of non-family gun homicides and gun 
robberies in the period of 1999-2000 recorded in the official crime reports (see Table 2).  
Understanding the dimensions of gun violence and its correlates in the 8
th precinct became the 
first step in providing technical assistance to the working group to assist in formulating an 
intervention. 
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Year Homicides Robberies Assaults
1999 33 598 341
2000 47 697 346
2001 37 622 370
Data Source: Detroit Police Department Official Crime Reports 
Police data were the first source consulted in attempting to sharpen the focus of the extent 
and nature of gun violence in the Eighth Precinct.  This included computerized data files 
containing arrests, incidents, and calls for service which were used to identify areas with 
particular problems in the 8
th precinct.  Due to data limitations, however, more effective 
understanding of the crime problem in the precinct was obtained by having researchers code 
police homicide files for motives, track CCW case processing through the court files maintained 
by the Wayne County Prosecutor’s office, and code the needs present in case histories of 
probationers and parolees that were 8
th precinct residents and “gun-involved,” and to perform 
interviews with a small group of gun offenders. 
A chart presenting homicide motives for 48 homicides committed in the Eighth precinct 
between 2000-2001 can be found in Figure 5.
1  Homicide analyses confirmed that domestic 
homicides presented only a small portion of the violence.  Not surprisingly, drug involvement, as 
indicated in Figure 6, was present in about two-thirds of the homicides.  As a motivating factor 
it appeared to be present in only 25 percent of the non-family cases.  Gang motivation was also 
absent as a motivating violent factor in Eighth precinct homicides.  Prior offending by victims 
and offenders, as illustrated in 37 homicide cases presented in Figure 7 indicate that less than 
half the offenders and victims had prior official records for violent crimes in Detroit.  Thus gangs 
and drugs appeared to contribute somewhat to homicides but a larger overall proportion were 
                                                 
1  Incomplete files, files in prosecution, and files not processed from late 2001 limit this to slightly more than half of 
all homicides committed in that period. 
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there was a view shared by a number of individuals that drugs was at the root of most gun 
violence in the city.  As the above analysis demonstrates although gun offenders may often be 
associated with drugs, the motivating factor for the incident in most cases was not about drugs or 
drug territory.  This finding appeared to sensitize the task force to a broader range of 
interventions than may have previously been considered. 
A large number of homicides appeared to be a function of the confluence of guns and 
grievances.  Disputes that erupted into lethal violence appeared to be a large problem in the 8
th 
precinct.  The 2002 case of Ajanee Pollard, an 8 year old precinct resident, illustrates a common 
type of homicide motivation.  As reported in the local newspapers, the 8-year old was killed in a 
drive by shooting (she was not the intended target) over a dispute about a radio sale that 
allegedly involved counterfeit money.  Other cases read by researchers included an instance of 
an unintentional “bump” in a party store that turned into a fatal shooting.  The motives in these 
events can be best understood in light of comments by a small group of “gun-involved” 
probationers who were interviewed about the nature of gun violence in the 8
th precinct during the 
spring of 2002.  The insights of the small group of gun offenders who lived in the Eighth 
precinct and were on probation for gun offenses are summarized below: 
¾  A general agreement that people mostly carry a gun for protection, but separated 
out those who “are not so smart” from the rest of the population – these are the folks that 
get into trouble, because they don’t know what a gun can do – they view it as a toy. 
 
¾  Some carry guns to get back at somebody or get their point across.   
 
¾  People carry guns because “something is happening every day” but they don’t 
realize that “bullets have no names and no eyes” 
 
¾  One participant thought that arguments go bad and guns make them lethal.  His 
knowledge of the dispute in the newspaper is that the two men were acquaintances and 
that the shooter felt that his “friends had played him.”  So he used a gun to prove he was 
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probationers.   No one wants to be disrespected, though they argued that fists (the “ones”) 
ought to settle the situation. 
 
¾  The group concurred that consequences were not something you think about on 
the street.  “People have nothing to lose” and they are “trying to get out of THIS 
situation.” 
 
¾  One respondent summarized the use of guns:  Guns are used to “get out of 
situations.” “[People] Don’t want to be no punk” but they “Don’t know the 
consequences.” Younger kids get offended easily and use guns to get respect on the 
street. 
 
The insight that homicides were often a product of an offender motivated by saving face 
and having a gun as a tool to ensure that respect was maintained (e.g. Fagan and Wilkinson, 
1998) generated several more questions from the working group and inspired the first SACSI 
intervention effort.   
The first intervention effort agreed upon by the working group was “Operation 8-ball” 
which was planned during the summer of 2001.  The operation used a Warrant Enforcement 
Team approach to warrant violators in the 8
th precinct who were likely to be gun involved based 
on the types of crime they had committed.  Other serious offenders who were wanted on 
warrants were also included in the grouping for a total of over 200 warrants.  The effort was 
unique because it focused efforts on one area and those offenders that were likely to be gun 
carriers, which is consistent with the finding that carrying guns was a necessary component for 
much of the lethal violence in the 8
th precinct.  The outcome of Operation 8-ball is detailed in the 
intervention section below. 
The following three questions appeared to be most pressing for the working group: What 
kinds of crimes do youthful gun carriers get involved in subsequent to gun arrests?  What 
happens to gun offenders caught in the 8
th precinct in terms of criminal justice processing?  And 
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th precinct? To be more 
precise, the working group had asked the first two questions early on in the analysis process. The 
answers, however, which were being investigated by the research team, were much more 
germane in crafting an intervention that might affect homicide and gun violence in light of the 
central role the mere presence of guns played in lethal violence. 
Data on 111 youthful (ages 17 to 25) offenders identified as residents of the 8
th precinct, 
who were arrested for CCW in 1997, were followed-up through electronic arrest records in 2000 
by using a police-generated identification number.  The data collection yielded strong links 
between those offenders caught carrying guns and future offenses (see Figure 8).  A quarter of 
the youths caught carrying weapons were arrested for a serious offense (homicide, robbery, 
assault) likely to involve a gun.  Additionally, sixty percent of the offenders had future 
involvement in serious crimes (as indicated by arrest) if one includes burglary, drug offenses, 
carrying a weapon, and auto theft in that definition.  These findings appeared to coalesce the 
working group’s view that the system response to CCW was not appropriate.  Typically in this 
jurisdiction, CCW offenses were not viewed as being serious crimes since no one was injured.  
However, given these findings the task force concluded that in many cases involvement in CCW 
cases served as an indicator of potential involvement in other more violent gun crimes, or at least 
indicating participation in a gun carrying culture in which the individual may become a victim as 
well as an offender.   
The working group’s concerns about the processing of cases through the courts were 
addressed by an examination of CCW cases that were processed through the 8
th precinct.  Hand 
searching of paper records in the precinct as well as computer searches of court databases was 
required to assess the outcome of 122 cases that were initiated by patrol officers in the 8
th 
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prosecution occurred for these cases.  Analysis of sanctions applied to the guilty offenders 
indicated that probation was the modal sentence and that incarceration only sometimes occurred 
when the offender had prior felony records.  This case tracking effort was a genesis for two 
working group decisions.  First, as noted above, to continue examining the youthful gun 
probationers as possible candidates for a specialized intensive program and to ensure tighter 
local and federal prosecution routines through cooperative case processing of felons with 
firearms.  These emphases are similar to what was emerging in other SASCI sites, with one 
group of interventions focused upon high rate gun offenders or locations and the other 
emphasizing focusing attention on modifications of the criminal justice system and its processing 
of gun violence cases.   
The former program required the examination of probationer records for offenders 
identified as living in the 8
th precinct.  Michigan Department of Corrections provided addresses 
of gun-involved probationers which were then plotted by the research team to determine whether 
they lived within the boundaries of the 8
th precinct.  Needs assessments with regards to drug use, 
employment and education were conducted by examining the Pre-Sentence Investigation files for 
50 of the individuals (see Figure 10).  The data indicated that while drug use was an issue for 
one-third of the probationers, 75% had unstable employment and 75% had failed to graduate 
from high school.  Using these data the working group convened meetings with Wayne County 
Community Justice (the agency that was responsible for community correctional programs), 
treatment providers, and Work Training programs to create a comprehensive program that would 
offer services to youthful probationers.  In addition, the probationers would also receive visits by 
police/probation teams in an effort to increase accountability while on probation. 
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gun court for the handling of CCW cases from the Eighth Precinct would constitute a viable and 
promising intervention.  Meetings were held with the relevant decision makers in the judiciary 
and with other parties to discuss the creation of this specialized court with increased supervision 
and intervention services for young gun offenders.  During the Spring of 2002, it appeared that 
the creation of this gun court was imminent.   While there was a consensus that this was 
desirable and the court was quite supportive, it ultimately was not implemented.  Two principle 
difficulties arose during this process that doomed this initiative.  First, it was imperative that a 
single judge supervise all the individuals in this caseload in order to insure consistency in 
response to violations and imposing of consistent supervision and probation conditions.  This 
proved difficult to do due to the complexity of the random case assignment process in the court.  
Second, there were considerable concerns from the defense bar regarding their perception of 
increased jeopardy for their clients given the higher level of supervision being imposed.  The 
defense bar wanted some considerations in the form of an expunged charge at the completion of 
the term of probation similar to the practice in drug court.  However, such a proposal for 
expunging of a gun offense was not acceptable to either the state or federal prosecutors.  This 
was quite frustrating to the working group as considerable time and effort had been devoted to 
the design and creation of this intervention.  This experience certainly points to the difficulty of 
implementing innovative strategies in a large and complex criminal justice system.   
The difficulties of implementing the program with probationers were not present with 
parolees in the 8
th precinct so the Michigan Department of Corrections and the Detroit Police 
Department, along with other members of the working group chose to identify gun involved 
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th precinct.  This component of the program has 
been implemented and is detailed below. 
 
SACSI Gun Violence Interventions in the Eighth Precinct 
  Two gun violence reduction efforts were undertaken under the umbrella of the SACSI 
working group.  Each was based on the collaborative research between the research partner and 
the working group.  The first, is the aforementioned, “Operation 8-ball,” which was a warrant 
sweep aimed at gun-involved offenders with outstanding warrants residing in the 8
th precinct.  
That component of the project was planned during the summer of 2001 and conducted during the 
last week of September 2001. 
  The second effort grew out of the intensive supervision, lever pulling meetings, and 
service enhancement for drug treatment, employment, and training that was proposed for 
probationers.  Since programming for gun involved probationers was not feasible, the working 
group instead turned to “gun-involved” parolees residing in the 8
th precinct as an intervention 
group. 
Operation 8-Ball 
During the summer of 2001 a multi-agency task force including Wayne County Sheriffs and their 
Warrant Enforcement Bureau, Detroit Police Department, Federal Marshalls, the Drug 
Enforcement Agency, Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, and the Michigan State Police, among 
others agreed to target the 8
th precinct of Detroit for a sweep focusing on known offenders with 
active warrants.  The target offenders were restricted to those that had non-serviced warrants, 
absconded parole or probation violators, or individuals with capias status.  The group was further 
restricted to offenders with “10 year felonies” and gun offenders to ensure that the most serious 
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offenders believed to be active in the 8
th precinct.  During a three day period in late September 
2001 multi-agency units attempted to serve the warrants during day-light and apprehended 71 
individuals from the list of eligible offenders.  Verbal communication with the commander of the 
8
th precinct indicated that at least one other known offender on the list turned himself in the 
following week; for fear that the police were still looking for him. 
Records compiled by the agencies indicate that the 71 offenders had the characteristics 
reported in Table 3:  The mean age of the offenders was nearly 32, but 14% were juvenile 
offenders.  Black offenders (89%) and males (79%) made up the majority of the apprehended 
offenders but the distributions are consistent with general arrest patterns found in the larger city 
in the period from 2000 through 2002.  In terms of status at the time of arrest 39% had a non-
serviced warrant (essentially wanted on an offense), 23% were parole violators, and 14% were 
probation violators.  With respect to the most current charge carried by the offender, 20% were 
wanted for assaults (only 2 were recorded as domestic cases), 9% for robbery, 10% for gun 
offenses.  The prevalence of serious prior offenses lends credence to the assertion that these 
offenders represented a particularly serious subset of all possible arrestees.  In the same month 
(September 2001), arrestees with charges for either serious assault or robbery made up 
approximately 7% of the total arrestees booked in Detroit lock-ups city-wide. 
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  Mean 
Offender Characteristics 
 
 
Age 31.6 
Race (1=Black, 0=White)  0.89 
Gender (1=Male, 0=Female)  0.79 
Juvenile Status (1=Yes, 0=No)  0.14 
Arrest Status 
 
Percent 
Parolee Violation   23% 
Probation Violation   14% 
Non-Serviced Warrant   39% 
Other Arrest Type   24% 
Current Offense 
   
Current Robbery   9% 
Current Assault   20% 
Gun Offense   10% 
Drug Offense   14% 
Burglary Offense   15% 
Other Offense  
 
32% 
 
 
Assessing the Impact of 8-ball on Armed Robbery 
The research team has conducted analysis on the suppression of gun robberies in the 8
th 
precinct and several control precincts (see Bynum and McCluskey, 2003 for more details).  Data 
were collected from official crime reports between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2003.  
Trend data were compiled to represent monthly totals of non-family, armed robberies involving 
guns in each precinct.   Gun robbery was chosen since it represented a gun victimization that 
typically involves strangers that might be most likely affected by focusing on incapacitating 
known serious offenders.   Large changes in homicides were unlikely to be observed since the 
number is fairly small and assaults are especially reliant on classification of victim-offender 
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was least likely to be an issue and produced a count that was sufficient to discern changes 
between pre and post intervention periods.  Single series can be analyzed using an intervention 
analysis approach, but to strengthen the quasi-experimental design we also included control 
series from an adjacent precinct (6
th) and a non-adjacent precinct (10
th).  This strengthens 
inferences as to whether the observed effects are genuine impacts of the operation and 
subsequent SACSI efforts or whether a decline or increase was experienced in contiguous or 
non-contiguous places, which might suggest a diffusion of benefits or displacement effect 
(Braga, et. al. 1999).  
With respect to mean level changes, T-tests of the pre and post intervention monthly 
mean levels of robbery indicate that there was a significant decline in robbery in the 8
th (11.2 
fewer per month) and 10
th (5 fewer per month) precincts.  A decline in the 6
th precinct of 2.5 
robberies per month occurred but was not statistically significant. Figure 11 presents the 
monthly trends for each of the three precincts gun robberies for a visual representation. 
 
 
 
Table 4: The Distribution of Robbery in 3 Precincts, 60 monthly observations recorded Jan 
1999 – Dec 2003 
 
Overall 
Mean Minimum Maximum
Pre-
Intervention 
Mean 
Post 
Intervention 
Mean 
         Eighth Precinct 
Robbery 47.9  17  81  52.9  41.7* 
         Sixth Precinct 
Robbery 27.0  14  52  28.1  25.7 
         Tenth Precinct 
Robbery 21.6 9  41  23.8  18.8* 
*T-test of the mean difference between pre and post intervention observations is significant. 
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(McDowall, 1980) since trends in the data may over or understate the differences in the 
preintervention and post intervention means.  Following McCleary and Hay’s (1980) Diagnosis, 
Identification, and Estimation steps as outlined in traditional ARIMA intervention analysis we 
estimated separate models for each of the three precincts.  Auto correlation functions (ACF) for 
the pre-whitened and whitened series are presented in Figures 12-16.  Results from the analysis 
are in Table 5 along with Box-Ljung Q-statistics, which indicate that the series had been reduced 
to the requisite white noise prior to the estimation of the models. 
 
Table 5: A Monthly Intervention Analysis for the 8-ball Initiative in Three Precincts 
 8
th Precinct  6
th Precinct  10
th Precinct
a
  Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Intercept  52.04* 2.57 28.06* 1.64 23.82* 1.13 
phi-1   0.11   0.13    0.22*  0.12  -   
phi-2     0.24*  0.13  -    -   
8-ball    -9.27* 3.74  -2.10  2.43 -5.00* 1.68 
        
Box-Ljung(12 lags)  15.1
b 9.96
b 12.6
b
Box-Ljung (24 lags)  34.0
b 23.66
b 24.24
b
a.  10
th Precinct analysis did not require ARIMA, Ordinary Least Squares results are presented 
*      p < .05, one tail test 
b.     Box-Ljung statistic is non-significant, indicating intervention analysis could be performed on the 
diagnosed series (note, in the case of the 10
th precinct, the series had no evidence of autocorrelation) 
 
 
Overall, with respect to the impact of 8-ball across the three precincts, it appears to have 
had a significant and negative impact on (reduction of) robbery in the 8th precinct but the 10
th 
precinct, which is not contiguous, also experienced a significant decline in gun robberies.  The 
6
th precinct (a bordering precinct) showed no significant change in robberies after the 
intervention.  Three explanations seem possible.  First, those responsible for robbery in the 8th 
may also have been active in the 10
th precinct, and to a lesser extent in the 6
th precinct.  The non-
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th precinct, however, indicate that a geographically closer precinct had 
no discernible change in robbery, which makes this explanation questionable.  Second, it is 
possible that other interventions in Detroit have affected robbery in the 10
th precinct, but they are 
unknown to us.  Finally, it is plausible that there is a general trend towards less robbery across all 
precincts, or at least the three included here.  Nevertheless, the extent of the decline appears 
greatest in the 8
th precinct where a 21% decline was recorded compared to 18% and 11% 
declines in the 10
th and 6
th precincts, respectively.  Thus, one could argue that, at the very least, 
the slope of the decline in robbery was increased by the initiation of operation 8-ball and other 
SACSI initiatives in the 8
th precinct.   The measurement of the enhanced parolee supervision that 
commenced the summer of 2002, while not necessarily being directly attributable to the decline 
in gun robberies, was focused on “gun involved” parolees residing in the 8
th precinct.  Thus, the 
SACSI working group did continue to focus on likely gun offenders within this geographic area.  
Next we will explore the nature and extent of enhanced supervision in the context of the Detroit, 
MI SACSI program and generate some measures of program inputs and outputs for individuals 
in the 8
th precinct from the summer of 2002 through December 2003. 
Gun-Involved Parolee Supervision Component 
The second strategy for addressing gun violence adopted by the working group was the Detroit 
SACSI Parolee initiative.  Prior to the commencement of this initiative the pre-sentence 
investigation (PSIs) reports of active parolees who had evidence of current or prior gun offenses 
and resided within precinct boundaries were examined by the research team. A total of 42 
offenders convicted of gun crimes were initially placed in this program that combined the efforts 
of Michigan Department of Corrections (DOC) and the Detroit Police Department.  At the 
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caseload.   
The enhanced parole supervision was initiated on July 11, 2002 when two groups of gun 
involved parolees, those over and those under age 30, were convened in the 8
th precinct’s 
meeting room.  Additional meetings were held approximately every 5-6 months for new 
parolees.  Speakers delivered a message of accountability and support.  The meeting was chaired 
by the Weed and Seed Coordinator in this precinct who set the tone for this meeting by 
indicating that the community did not want these individuals to either again be a perpetrator of 
gun crimes nor did they want them to be a victim of gun violence, either of which was quite 
likely to happen if they adopted their previous lifestyle.  This theme was reinforced by other 
speakers including the U.S. Attorney, executives from Michigan’s Department of Corrections, 
the Weed & Seed Coordinator, the 8
th precinct Commander, and a reformed offender.  Each of 
the sessions lasted approximately one hour and served both as notification that the precinct 
police and parole office would be visiting each offender more intensively and an opportunity for 
offenders to avail themselves of community resources.  The following items capture the core of 
the message delivered:   
•  Parolees have done their time for their offenses; 
•  It is time for the parolees to rejoin the community as members; 
•  The community does not want to see the parolee as a victim or offender in the 
future; 
•  If parolees persisted in committing future gun crimes, they will be subject to 
enhanced federal penalties. 
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curtailed by the changes in the local economy.  Access to extensive employment assistance and 
treatment programs were to be a significant aspect of this component of SACSI.  However, 
services beyond those generally available to the entire pool of parolees in Detroit, did not 
materialize. Thus, it was decided not to focus data collection on any services that these parolees 
might have received, since only those typically available to parolees, contrary to the program’s 
intent, were available. 
After collecting baseline data on the parolees assigned to this caseload, a matching 
procedure was used to identify appropriate parolees similar to those individuals assigned to the 
SASCI caseload.  A data file containing information on all active Parolees in Detroit was 
provided by the Michigan Department of Corrections.  Individuals were matched on race, sex, 
offense type, and age, and approximately 5-6 potential matches were initially selected and then 
grouped with each of their respective SACSI parolees.  At this point, a specific individual was 
randomly selected from the grouping of 5-6 potentials.  In order to obtain the salient information 
required for scientific comparison and analysis, the pre-sentence investigation (PSI) reports of 
the SACSI parolees and each of their matches was coded.  Some examples of pertinent 
quantitative information culled from the PSIs included: demographics, current offense data, 
juvenile and adult criminal history, use of alcohol and illegal drugs, education, work experience, 
family characteristics data, and physical and mental health background.  PSIs were coded by a 
group of researchers from Michigan State University (MSU) in a manner that sought to eliminate 
variability through standardization of the interpreting and recording of data.  The vast majority of 
these PSIs were available from the agents at the Outer Drive Parole Office in Detroit.  A 
contingency plan for coding also existed, so if the case file of the matched parolee was 
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proportion of case files had to be obtained from the Central Records office in Lansing because 
the parolee had either been sent back to prison for a violation or new crime, absconded, or was 
discharged.   
This coding process was repeated at three other intervals to ensure that the records 
collected by MSU were up-to-date and corresponded with those in the Outer Drive Parole Office 
throughout the duration of this project.  As mentioned, the coding of the first group of SACSI 
and matched parolees took place in July 2002.  MSU records were updated with new SACSI 
parolees and new matched parolees in September 2002.  In April 2003, the SACSI caseload was 
shifted to another Outer Drive parole agent and the list was updated the third time.  Finally, the 
list was updated in February 2004 with new SACSI additions and matched parolees.   
An enumeration of specific data collected by MSU is warranted.  Drug test dates and 
results were gathered for both SACSI and matched parolees to compare frequency of testing, 
positive results, and the type of drug identified.  With regard to services and counseling provided 
to parolees, the specific program name, the start date, dates missed, whether the parolee 
successfully completed the program, and the frequency of his/her attendance were sought.  
Unfortunately, the services and counseling component of the SACSI initiative fell short of initial 
expectations due to resource constraints and did not provide an acceptable number of measurable 
instances.  Non-drug violations were also compiled and compared between the SASCI and match 
group, as well as the resultant disposition and whether parole was revoked.   Various types of 
contact data were also collected.  Efforts sought to differentiate among contacts that happened at 
home from those that happened in the parole office, as well as whether contacts were made via 
the telephone.  Other contact verifications were made at the parolee's residence, employment 
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substantive picture of the extent that SACSI programming truly differed from the programming 
received by non-SACSI parolees, and whether the targeted effort actually resulted in fewer 
instances of recidivism (whether through new technical violations or new crimes). 
  During the course of the program the supervision was extended to all gun parolees in the 
8
th precinct regardless of age (this occurred in September 2002) and a “rolling” admission and 
graduation from the program generated changing numbers of program participants.   The size of 
the monthly comparisons ranges from 46 to 71 parolees on enhanced supervision from the July 
2002-December 2003 period. The research team documented both the intensity of supervision 
and several official outcomes for parolees in the 8
th precinct as compared to their city wide 
control group on a case by case basis with the assistance of the Michigan Department of 
Corrections.  This has been aggregated to a monthly caseload level for comparisons between the 
control group and the enhanced supervision group for purposes of this report.  Monthly data were 
collected from January 2002 through December 2003 for both the control and enhanced 
supervision groups.  The four important questions we can address with these data include: Did 
the parolees in the enhanced supervision group actually receive more intensive supervision after 
the program started in July 2002?  If so, how much and what types of contact did they receive?  
Was the change in supervision levels significantly different from similarly situated offenders 
drawn from other areas of the city? Did the enhanced supervision group have a significantly 
different level of violations compared to the control group?  The first three focus on the process 
of the enhanced supervision and the last addresses whether the program had any effects in terms 
of substantive case outcomes. 
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gun involved parolees in the 8
th precinct received before and after the implementation of the 
program.  Six months of contact data were available for the group initially assigned to enhanced 
supervision.  By way of comparison to the caseload, once enhanced supervision began a 
statistically significant difference in home visits (a more than 5 fold increase) but a significant 
and perhaps expected decline in the level of phone contact with parolees was apparent.  The level 
of home contacts with parolees approached one visit face-to-face per month subsequent to the 
program’s implementation.  Little change in office contact levels indicates that this added effort 
was not supplanted with reduced contact in that area.  
Table 6: Levels of Monthly Contact for Parolees Pre and Post Supervision Enhancement 
 Overall 
Pre 
Enhanced 
Post 
Enhanced 
 Minimum  Maximum  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Mean  Mean 
Home 0.06  1.82  0.63  0.48  0.15  0.79* 
Office 2.03  3.21  2.72  0.28  2.83  2.69 
Phone 0.19  1.05  0.55  0.23  0.79  0.47* 
Collateral 0.63 1.80  1.16  0.28 1.26  1.13 
* p < .05 two tailed t-test 
  The question remains, however, whether the group was treated differently in terms of 
levels of contacts that were received by other parolees in different parts of the city.  The short 
six-month pre-observation period was thus augmented by following a cohort of matched parolees 
for month-by-month comparisons to determine whether the difference in supervision was 
significant.  The 18 months for which we have aggregate data on contacts compiled across the 
groups we found the enhanced supervision levels, in particular home visits, were exceptionally 
high compared to the control group parolees.   
  The graphs in Figure 17 and 18 illustrate the comparison of contacts between the two 
groups at home and in terms of office visits.  Over the 18 months of enhanced supervision the 8
th 
  31
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.precinct gun involved parolees did receive a higher level of supervision than the cases assigned 
as matched controls.  This is confirmed by t-tests presented in Table 7.  The mean level of home 
contacts per month was .79 for the enhanced supervision group and .13 for the corresponding 
controls.   This is consistent with the five-fold increase for the pre and post enhanced 
surveillance comparison between the 6 months prior to the establishment of enhanced parole. 
Similarly, the enhanced group had 2.69 contacts per month in the office compared to 1.88 for the 
monthly level of the control group.  Consistent with increased supervision in all areas the gun 
parolees in the 8
th precinct also received significantly higher levels of phone and collateral 
contacts than the match group.  This furthers the argument that, at least with respect to 
surveillance, there was a significant increase in the level of contact between parole officers and 
gun offenders in the 8
th precinct when compared with city-wide matches.  As noted previously, 
the resources upon which those parolees might have drawn upon were likely very similar to 
those in the remainder of the city. 
Table 7:  Control and Matched Monthly Supervision Levels July 2002-December 2003 
 
Monthly Level per 
Parolee Group  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Home Contacts  Control 0.13  0.14 
 Enhanced 0.79*  0.46 
Office Contacts  Control 1.88  0.23 
 Enhanced 2.69*  0.32 
Phone Contacts  Control 0.25   0.17 
 Enhanced 0.47*  0.19 
Collateral Contacts  Control 0.75  0.19 
 Enhanced 1.13*  0.30 
* p < .05 two-tail test 
One theme that consistently appears in the literature on enhanced supervision (e.g., 
Turner & Petersilia, 1992) is that the programs often have the adverse or unintended effect of 
creating more recidivism due to the enhanced supervision.  Though this program is aimed 
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enhanced supervision group had higher levels of violations per offender than the match group of 
parolees.  We conducted similar analyses on the pre and post 8
th precinct group as well as 
comparisons between the 8
th precinct and match parolees.  Data were collected on substance 
abuse violations of urine screens, which we argue might measure proactive observation of the 
enhanced program and a total measure, inclusive of Substance Abuse Testing (SAT) results, 
which measures parole violations.  Contrasts are listed in tables 8 and 9 below. 
Table 8: Monthly Violation Levels for Enhanced Parole Pre and Post Program 
Implementation 
 
Violation Type  Program  N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
SAT Pre  6 0.05 0.03 
 Post  18 0.09
a 0.09 
OTHER Pre  6 0.03 0.02 
 Post  18 0.03 0.04 
       a. Significant contrast at p <.05, one tail test 
Table 9: Enhanced Supervision Parolee vs. Matches: A Comparison of Violations 
Violation 
Type  Group 
Months 
Compared
Mean 
Level 
per 
Parolee 
Std. 
Deviation 
SAT Control 18 0.03 0.03 
 Enhanced 18 0.09* 0.09 
OTHER Control 18 0.05 0.04 
 Enhanced 18 0.03 0.04 
   * p <.05 two tailed test 
  It appears that the enhanced supervision did uncover more substance abuse issues among 
the parolees, however, other types of violations were not as high for that group.  Thus, contacting 
the gun offenders at home, on a monthly basis, did not appear to increase the levels of violations 
beyond positive SATs, which is contrary to expectations derived from literature on intensive 
correctional programming which indicates that as supervision levels increase so do the number 
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however, have reinforced positive behaviors.   This is, however; conjecture, since the measures 
analyzed here are at the aggregate level comparing matches with controls. Further examination 
of individual offenders’ trajectories over the life of the program, and intensity of supervision, 
would be necessary to understand whether this initiative had more positive effects for certain 
types of parolees under differing conditions of supervision.   
Conclusion 
  The SACSI effort with regard to enhanced supervision coalesced around identifying a 
small area where local stakeholders in the precinct and parole office would be willing to 
cooperate together at the line level.  Had the focus of the effort been city-wide it is unlikely that 
it would have been able to sustain itself for a long period.  The partnership between the 
Department of Corrections and the 8
th precinct, however, is ongoing and continues to operate 
beyond the project period.   
  Similarly, the 8-ball effort also focused on offenders in a small geographic area and 
galvanized the efforts of local, county, state, and federal agencies to enforce active warrants 
against 72 offenders within the precinct over the course of three days.  This short term 
enforcement effort represented a concentrated dose (e.g. Sherman, 1990) and appears to have 
contributed to a significant decline in subsequent robberies in that area. 
  Both efforts commenced with a problem solving process that involved asking questions 
such as: 
•  To what extent are guns, gangs, or drugs associated with violent crime in Detroit? 
•  Where is gun violence occurring most frequently in Detroit? 
•  Who is most likely to be involved in that violence? 
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•  Where might that cooperation be most successful in reducing violence? 
•  What “levers” are available to criminal justice agencies to reduce individuals’ 
involvement in violence? 
Given these facts and the changes made to routine criminal justice processing in the 8
th 
precinct under the SACSI initiative, it is apparent that modest and focused change can be 
obtained through the strategic approach.   The interaction between the experience of the SACSI 
working group and the data analysis that grew out of the discussions of this group produced 
several dynamic interventions.  However, the lasting lessons that emerged from the SACSI in 
Detroit have implications for this approach in this and other jurisdictions. 
  The working group was guided by several viewpoints that framed much of the early 
discussion, data analysis, and direction of the interventions.  First, much of the early discussion 
was concerned with the focus upon enhanced federal penalties for felons in possession of a 
firearm and how this new “tool” could be used.  At one point an experienced police commander 
stated, “We can get tough all we want but who is going to believe us?”  He went on to note that 
this would be the latest in a long line of talking tough but not being able to deliver on the 
message.  This discussion lead to a focus upon what has been termed in other SACSI sites as 
“system fixes”; ways in which the processing of cases could be enhanced to reduce the 
“slippage” in the system.  Through this discussion enhanced attention was focused upon greater 
coordination of case processing across the criminal justice system particularly in the Eighth 
Precinct.  Although no data were available regarding this aspect of the initiative, it is likely that 
these efforts to make sanctions more certain can have a significant impact in improving the 
response to gun crime.   
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degree, gun offenders operate as if they are invisible to the criminal justice system and in many 
instances they are correct.  Thus additional efforts were discussed regarding how to increase 
awareness of those individuals potentially involved in gun violence in the target area.  Certainly 
one of these efforts was through expanded knowledge of gun offense parolees in the 8
th Precinct.  
The conducting of home visits with the parole officer and precinct special operations officers 
served not only a deterrence function but also increased the awareness by the officers of the 
identities of these individuals having a history of gun violence.  In addition, toward the 
conclusion of the SACSI initiative efforts were begun to establish a most violent gun offender 
program similar to the WOW initiative in St. Louis.   
  While these were important achievements for SACSI, it is also important to acknowledge 
a series of challenges that presented difficulties for this initiative.  First, the size of this 
jurisdiction and the complexity of its criminal justice system make changes and system 
modifications quite difficult.   A prime example of this difficulty was the previously discussed 
initiative to create a gun violence court.  A considerable effort was expended by the working 
group and the research team on program design and significant support and commitments were 
obtained from other agencies to participate in this component.  However given the size of the 
court and the complexity of its case assignment process (the early identification of 8
th precinct 
cases and the subsequent assignment to one judge presented insurmountable obstacles) as well as 
the entrenchment of the defense bar rendered this considerable effort futile. 
  Another particular challenge in the SASCI initiative was the difficulty in maintaining 
momentum within the working group over the life of the project.  During the life of this initiative 
there were three police chiefs in the City of Detroit.  During each of these administrations there 
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representation in the working group from DPD.  Relationships had to be rebuilt as the new 
personnel were introduced to the strategic problem solving process of SACSI and new data 
sharing agreements had to be reached.   In addition, with each new administration came 
personnel changes at the precinct level and new officers and supervisors had to be brought on 
board and educated regarding the goals, objectives, and operation of the various SACSI 
components.   In addition to the personnel changes within the police department, there were 
personnel changes regarding the representatives to the SACSI working group from other 
agencies as well over this life of this initiative.   In any organization changes in personnel can 
bring about variation in the level of commitment to various initiatives.   
  Regardless of these impediments, the significant achievements of the SACSI initiative in 
Detroit should not be underestimated.  The working group along with the research team 
conducted a careful examination of the dynamics of gun violence and the manner in which such 
cases are processed within the criminal justice system.  Perhaps for the first time in this 
jurisdiction, a data driven strategy was put in place to address gun violence in a selected target 
area.  In addition, the working group continues to exist and meets to work on these interventions.  
Further, relationships have been enhanced across agency lines and a stronger working 
relationship has been established between agencies, particularly the Detroit Police Department 
and the Michigan Department of Corrections.  These achievements are likely to constitute lasting 
positive effects of the SACSI initiative in Detroit.  
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Figure 1.  Official Crime Reports and Gun Involvement, Detroit Police Department OCR 
data 1999 
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Figure 2: Detroit Police Department Geographic Deployment Grid 
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Figure 3: Persistent Quarterly Armed Robbery (>15) January 2000-September 2001. 
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Figure 4: Indicators of community stability across precincts 
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Figure 5: Homicide Motives (n=48) 
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Figure 6: Drug Involvement and Drug Motivation in 37 Non-Family 8
th Precinct Homicides (2000-2001) 
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Figure 9: Case processing of 122 Patrol-initiated CCW cases in Eighth Precinct during 2000 
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Figure 11:  Monthly Gun Robbery Totals Jan 1999 – Dec 2003 for Detroit’s 6
th, 8
th, and 10
th precincts, with 8-ball Intervention 
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Figure 12: 8
th precinct Autocorrelation Function for Gun Robberies 
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a. ARIMA modeling not required since there is no evidence of significant autocorrelation 
across observations
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Figure 17: Enhanced Parole vs. Matches: Monthly Home Contacts per Parolee 
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Figure 18: Enhanced Parole vs. Matches: Monthly Office Contacts per Parolee 
 
 
 
 
 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
References 
 
Blumstein, A. (1995). Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry. Journal of 
Criminal Law & Criminology, 86, 10-36. 
 
Blumstein, A., Cohen, J., Roth, J. A., & Visher, C. A. (1986). Criminal Careers and 
"Career Criminals". Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 
 
Braga, A. A. (2003). Serious Youth Gun Offenders and the Epidemic of Youth Violence 
in Boston. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 19, 33-54. 
 
Braga, A.A., Kennedy, D., Waring, E., Piehl, A.. (2001). "Problem-oriented policing, 
deterrence, and youth violence: An evaluation of Boston's operation ceasefire." 
Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 38(3): 195-225. 
 
Bynum, T. S. & McCluskey, J.D. (2003). “Street Level Firearms Enforcement: 
Examining the Effects of Saturation and Suppression Activities.” Paper presented 
at the XIII World Congress of Criminology: Rio De Janeiro, Brazil. 
 
Cook, P. J., & Laub, J. H. (2002). After the Epidemic:  Recent Trends in Youth Violence 
in the United States. In M. Tonry & N. Morris (Eds.), Crime and Justice: An 
Annual Review (Vol. 29, pp. 1-37). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Dahlberg, L. L. (1998). Youth Violence in the United States: Major Trends, Risk Factors, 
and Prevention Approaches. American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 14, 259-
272. 
 
Fagan, J.A. and Wilkinson, D.L. 1998. "Guns, Youth Violence and Social Identity in 
Inner Cities." In Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, Volume 24 on Youth 
Violence, Edited by M. Tonry and M. Moore. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. p. 105-188. 
 
Giblin, M. J. (2002). Using police officers to enhance the supervision of juvenile 
probationers: An evaluation of the Anchorage CAN program. Crime and 
Delinquency, 48(1), 116-137. 
 
Huebner, B. M., Bynum, T. S., & Hinduja, S. (2001). Firearm Use among Michigan’s 
Youthful Offender Population. East Lansing, MI: Michigan St. School of Criminal 
Justice. 
 
Jacob, J. H., & Rich, M. J. (1981). The effects of police on crime: A second look. Law & 
Society Review, 15, 109-122. 
 
Kennedy, D. M. (1997). “Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a 
Theory of Prevention.” Valparaiso University Law Review 31:449–484. 
  56
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Kennedy, D. M., Braga, A. A., & Piehl, A. M. (2001). Reducing Gun Violence: The 
Boston Gun Project's Operation Ceasefire. Washington, D.C.: National Institute 
of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice. 
 
Lizotte, Alan J., Trudy L. Bonsell, David McDowall,, Terence P. Thornberry, and Marvin 
D. Krohn.  2002.  Carrying guns and involvement in crime.  Pp. 145-158 in 
Robert A. Silverman, Terence P. Thornberry, Bernard Cohen, and Barry Krisberg.  
Crime and Justice at the Millennium: Essays by and in Honor of Marvin E. 
Wolfgang.  Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Lizotte, A. J., & Sheppard, D. (2001). Gun Use by Male Juveniles: Research and 
Prevention. Bulletin. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 
Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. 
 
Lizotte, A. J., Tesoriero, J. M., Thornberry, T. P., & Krohn, M. D. (1994). Patterns of 
Adolescent Firearms Ownership and Use. Justice Quarterly, 11, 51-73. 
 
Martin, S. E., & Sherman, L. W. (1986). Selective apprehension: A police strategy for 
repeat offenders. Criminology, 24(1), 155-173. 
 
McCleary, R., & Hay, R. (1980). Applied time series analysis. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
 
McDowall, D., McCleary, R., Meidinger, E. E., Hay, R. (1980). Interrupted time series 
analysis.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
McGarrell, E. F., Chermak, S., Weiss, A., & Wilson, J. (2001). Reducing firearms 
violence through directed police patrol. Criminology & Public Policy, 1(1), 119-
148. 
Petersilia, J. & Turner, S. (1992). "An Evaluation of Intesive Probation in California." 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 82:610-658.  
Piehl, A. M., Kennedy, D. M. & Braga A. A. (2000) "Problem Solving and Youth 
Violence: An Evaluation of the Boston Gun Project." American Law and 
Economics Review 2, 58-106. 
 
Policy Studies, Inc. (2004).  What Does It Take to Make Collaboration Work: Lessons 
Learned Through the Criminal Justice System Project?  National Institute of 
Justice Journal (251). 
 
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. (1968). 
The challenge of crime in a free society. New York, NY: Avon. 
 
Sampson, R. J., & Cohen, J. (1988). Deterrent effects of the police on crime: A 
replication and theoretical extension. Law & Society Review, 22(1), 163-189. 
  57
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Sherman, L .W. (1990). "Police Crackdowns: Initial and Residual Deterrence." In M. 
Tonry and N. Morris (eds.), Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research , 
Vol. 12. Chicago : University of Chicago Press. 
 
Sherman, L. W., & Rogan, D. P. (1995). The effects of gun seizures on gun violence: 
"Hot spots" patrol in Kansas City. Justice Quarterly, 12, 673-693. 
 
Tesoriero, J. T. (1998). A Longitudinal Study of Weapon Ownership and Use Among 
Inner-City Youth. Ann Arbor, MI: UMI. 
 
Vaughn, R. D., McCarthy, J. F., Armstrong, B., Walter, H. J., Waterman, P. D., & Tiezzi, 
L. (1996). Carrying and Using Weapons: A Survey of Minority Junior High 
School Students in New York City. American Journal of Public Health, 86, 568-
572. 
 
Wilson, J. Q., & Boland, B. (1978). The effect of police on crime. Law & Society 
Review, 12, 367-390. 
 
Wintemute, G. (2000). Guns and Gun Violence. In A. Blumstein & J. Wallman (Eds.), 
The Crime Drop in America (pp. 45-96). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Wolfgang, M. E., Figlio, R. M., & Sellin, T. (1972). Delinquency in a Birth Cohort. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Wright, J. D. and P. Rossi. (1994) Armed and Considered Dangerous. New York: Aldine 
De Gruyter. 
 
Zimring, F. E., & Hawkins, G. (1997). Crime is Not the Problem: Lethal Violence in 
America. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  58
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix 1: 
 
Alphabetical List Agencies Participating in Detroit  S.A.C.S.I. 
 
 
Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (A.T. F.) 
 
Drug Enforcement Agency (D.E.A.) 
 
Detroit Police Department 
 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.) 
 
Michigan Department of Corrections 
 
Michigan State Police 
 
Southeast Michigan High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) 
 
U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan 
 
Wayne County Office of Community Justice 
 
Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office 
 
Wayne County Sheriff’s Office 
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